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I. Introduction
Since the mid-seventies, the general public of some European
countries has been listening to a growing chorus of economists
and politicians who lament the rising regional imbalances of un-
employment. The chorus is especially large in Britain and West
Germany where both an approximate north-south divide began to
take shape, with the old industrial north and north-west appar-
ently losing ground to the still flourishing south in the common
fight against low growth and high unemployment.
Somewhat surprisingly, the main tune of this chorus about the
growing importance of structural (above all, regional) components
of unemployment did not find support in some pioneering empirical
estimates of the inter temporal change of structural unemployment
as presented i.a. by Jackman/Layard/Pissar ides .(1984), Johnson/
Layard (1985), Layard/Nickel1/Jackman (1985), Layard (1986),
Jackman/ Roper (1986, 1987) and Pissarides (1987) for the United
Kingdom, and Franz/Konig (1986), Burda/Sachs (1987) and Franz
(1987) for Germany. All these studies rely on measures of mis-
match between unemployed workers and vacancies to account for the
structural component of unemployment which, as a share of total
employment, turns out to have not substantially increased in ei-
ther country during the seventies and eighties. By now, these
empirical studies have almost established a new consensus among
macroeconomists that, after all, the growth of structural unem-
ployment has been heavily exaggerated and that, as a consequence,
research efforts should turn to aggregate, not structural matters
to explain the secular employment malaise.- 2 -.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that these conclusions
are not warranted since the underlying empirical evidence is se-
riously misleading. To establish this claim we shall proceed as
follows. In Section II, we shall demonstrate that the commonly
used measures of mismatch imply that, for all that matters empir-
ically, no period with a significant share of structural in total
unemployment is ever likely to emerge; hence, economists should
literally stop worrying about structural unemployment altogether,
not because it has not substantially increased in recent years in
the countries in question, but because it is no relevant issue in
any realistic setting. This is a conclusion which probably no
economist would like to draw, but which he must draw if he relies
on the commonly used measures. In Section III, we shall argue
that this unfortunate conclusion is due to a misguided philosophy
of what the term "structural" should mean if it is to be a sensi-
ble economic category; thereby, we shall make a case for an al-
ternative philosophy of structural unemployment which conforms
more to what economists actually mean in their daily use of the
term.
II. Measures of Mismatch and Structural Unemployment
Following Turvey (1977), the modern literature identifies struc-
tural unemployment as the result of a mismatch between job vacan-
cies and unemployed workers. Structural unemployment is taken to
exist "if, given the configuration of vacancies, it would be pos-
sible to reduce unemployment, or more precisely, to increase the
rate of job hiring by moving an unemployed worker from one sector- 3 -
to another" (Jackman/Roper, p. 11), with the sector being an oc-
cupation, industry, region or any other structural category, and
the rate of job separations assumed to be exogenously determined.
Conversely, structural balance or zero structural unemployment is
postulated to prevail whenever it is impossible to increase the
rate of job hirings and thus to reduce unemployment through in-
tersectoral movements of the unemployed. The rationale behind
this definition has some intuitive appeal: only to the extent
that the particular (mal-)distribution of unemployed workers and
vacancies and the resulting mismatch across sectors in fact con-
tributes to overall unemployment, does it make sense to speak of
unemployment caused by an existing structural imbalance, i.e., of
structural or better: mismatch unemployment.
 ;
In more technical terms, the state of structural balance can be
described as that configuration of the existing stock of unem-
ployment across sectors which, given the sectoral pattern of va-
cancies, maximizes aggregate hires. Hence, to obtain a set of
operational first-order conditions for structural balance to
hold, one has to postulate a hiring function H( ). If, for any
sector i, this function is assumed to have the common form
<1) H. = H (U., V.) with 3H/^LJ., ^H/^V. > 0
l l ' l l ' l
where U. and V. are the numbers of unemployed workers and vacan-
cies in sector i and H< ) is a convex, linear homogeneous func-
tion, then it can easily be shown that maximization of aggregate
hires H = T H. subject to 51 U. = U = constant (taking. V. as giv-
en) requires the ratio of unemployed workers to vacancies to beequal across all sectors and thus equal to the respective overall
ratio. This implies that
(2) U./U = V./V for i = 1, ..., n,
with U (and V respectively) being the aggregate number of unem-
ployed workers (and vacancies respectively). Following the logic
of equation (2), a measure of mismatch can be defined as
(3) li := 1/2 JT JU./U - V./Vl
M gives the share of the unemployed workers which would have to
be moved across sectors to achieve structural balance at a given
configuration of vacancies, or conversely, the share of vacancies
which would have to be moved to achieve structural balance at a
given configuration of unemployed workers. Multiplying li by U (or
V) yields the respective absolute number of unemployed workers
(or vacanc ies).
M is the most frequently used index of structural mismatch in the
2) modern literature. As has been recognized, it does not measure
the extent of structural unemployment in the sense that, if
structural balance were established, unemployment would fall by
the share M; rather, it measures the share of unemployed workers
which would have to be moved to achieve a maximum of hirings,
with yet no quantifiable implications on how much employment
could be thus gained. However, it is this potential employment
gain which gives us an idea of the dimension of a structural un-
employment problem, and not the sheer number or share of people- 5 -
to be moved. Unfortunately, this employment gain cannot be deter-
mined without fully specifying a model of the labour market. Nev-
ertheless, the hiring function may serve as the basis for an op-
erational - albeit partial - measure of structural unemployment:
one may ask by how much total unemployment could be reduced if
structural balance were achieved at a q iyen level of aggregate
h irings.
To answer this question, one has to specify the parametric shape
of the hiring function. In the literature the most widely used
sectoral hiring function is of the linear-homogeneous Cobb-
Douglas-type
1/2 1/2 H. = (i U. V. with {I > 0,
which goes back to Holt <1970) and which has received some empir-
ical support in a number of more recent empirical studies (Han-
nah, 1983; Jackman/Layard/Pissarides 198^; Jackman/Roper 1986,
1987). In aggregate, we obtain






^ ) It can now be shown that the share of unemployment which could
be removed at a constant level of hirings if structural balance
were established through intersectoral mobility, is given by





 1- 6 -
Note that the index S does not quite measure the potential em-
ployment gain of achieving structural balance; rather it measures
the 'cost' of structural imbalance in terms of the share of ag-
gregate unemployment which could be 'spared' at a given level of
hirings if only structural balance were established. This seem-
ingly awkward measure makes much economic sense: unlike M, the
index S does give a clue to how important structural compared to
non-structural factors are in hampering the process of hiring
additional labour. In this sense, S (and not M) is the relevant
measure of the share of structural in total unemployment.
To get an impression of the quantitative range of S for different
parameter configurations, let us drastically simplify the analy-
sis by assuming an economy of just two sectors (1, 2), with sec-
tor 1 having a share a (0 ^ a ^ 1) in total unemployment and a
share b (0 ^ b ^ 1) in the total number of vacancies, and sector
2 having shares of (1 - a) and (1 - b) respectively. In this set-
ting, the mismatch index can simply be written as
(7) M = I a - bl ,
and the corresponding index of structural unemployment S as





Table Is The share of structural unemployment (index S, in 7.) for
for selected configurations of a and b





































































































































Table 1 shows the values of S for different parameter configura-
tions of a and b. The striking fact is that, for a wide range of
a (O.E < a < 0.8) and b (O.E < b < 0.8) and a correspondingly
wide range of M (0 < M < 0.6), the index S stays below £0 '/.. Only
for extremely unequal distributions of unemployment and vacan-
cies, with a being close or equal to 0 (or 1) and b being close
to 1 (or 0), does structural unemployment amount to a share of
total unemployment in the magnitude of the non-structural part.Clearly, the index S is very sensitive to changes in a and b in
the ranges of already extreme inequality: e.g., with b = 1 - a, a
shift from a = 0.8 to a = 0.9 increases the share S from SO to ^0
'/.; a further shift from 0.9 to 1 even leads to a most dramatic
rise of S from 4-0 to 100 */.. -
What does all this mean in the more familiar language of unem-
ployment and vacancy rates? If one assumes the two sectoral units
to have an equally-sized labour force L with an average unemploy-
ment and an average vacancy rate of 10 */., the restrictions a =
0.8 and b = 0.S imply that, in sector 1, the unemployment rate is
16 V. and the vacancy rate ** '/., in sector S vice versa. Any casual
observer would interpret this as a situation of severe structural
imbalance, but the index S does not classify more than SO */. of
the unemployment as structural. Other numbers from Table 1 are
quickly picked to support the general impression that, relative
to a still vague intuitive standard (to which we return in Sec-
tion III), S is a very conservative measure of structural unem-
ployment in the empirically relevant ranges.
Let us now go back to the real world with its much greater number
of sectoral units than two. Table S presents some actual indices
of regional unemployment for Great Britain and West Germany. ForO —
Table S: Indices M and S for regional unemployment in Great Britain and West
Germany (selected years)






































"LAA = Landesarbeitsamtsbezirk ('state labour district').
AA = Arbeitsamtsbezirk ('local labour district').
Schleswig-Holstein incl. Hamburg; Lower Saxony incl. Bremen; Saar excluded.
Schleswig-Holstein (incl. Hamburg); Baden-Wurttemberg.
[Source: for Britain, Employment Gazette, August 1988; for Germany, Amtliche
Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit, Jahreszahlen 1987; Bundes-
minister fur Arbeit, Statistik 1950; M and S calculated on basis of
annual average figures for 1987 and March figures for 1950.]
1987, the indices show that regional mismatch as measured by M
and regional unemployment as measured by B were more severe prob-
lems in Germany than in Britain. However, the outstanding feature
is again the low level of the index S: in Germany, less than 5 '/.- 10 -
of actual unemployment can be identified as structural; in Brit-
ain, the respective share turns out to be even smaller, a negli-
gible 1.3 '/,. To check whether the index S is ever likely to indi-
cate a substantial share of structural in total unemployment, we
turn to the early post-war period which is commonly viewed as a
time of extreme regional imbalance of unemployment in Germany -
probably the worst ever - since the refugees from the former eas-
tern provinces had flooded the rural north (above all, the states
Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony) while some industrial states
(Northrhine-Westfalia, Baden-Wurttemberg) enjoyed full employ-
ment, sometimes even labour shortages. Nevertheless, for the year
1950, the index S stays below 10 'A; even if one selects the two
polar states in terms of unemployment and vacancy rates (Schles-
wig-Holstein, Baden—WOrttemberg) to form an artificial two—state
country to be subject to interstate movements of labour to
achieve regional balance, the index S rises just above SO V,, not
more. All this supports our prior contention that, for all that
matters empirically, it is very hard to find any period in which
regional or, more generally, structural unemployment of the kind
described above plays more than a marginal part in the overall
unemployment picture.
As to the development of the indices in recent years, it has been
shown by Jackman, Roper (1987) that, for Britain, M and S have
been constant or even decreasing in recent years. Thereby, it
is worth noting that the share of structural unemployment as
measured by S has never exceeded about 7 '/. since the early seven-
ties. For West Germany, the picture is somewhat different (Table
3): taking five-year averages, there has been a notable increase- 11 -
of the regional mismatch index M which was more pronounced across
states than across local labour districts (implying that the
structural imbalance underwent a kind of qualitative shift away
from intra-state towards inter-state imbalances). In the same
vein, the share of structural unemployment S increased from about
1 to 3 or 3.5 to ^.5 '/., depending on which sectoral units are
used. Still then, the main message of these measures remains
their surprisingly low level, not their inter temporal change: if,
at present, regional as a share of total unemployment does not
amount to more than h % in West Germany and less than £ '/. in
Britain, one should definitely stop worrying about it altogether,
even if it could be shown that it has doubled in the last 15
years.
Clearly, our conclusion depends on the parametric shape of the
hiring function: with other hiring technologies than Cobb—Doug-
las , somewhat less disturbing results may emerge. However, in
view of the empirical evidence which supports a hiring function
of the type given in equation (5), any adjustments of the func-
tional form remain ad hoc attempts to escape unpleasant implica-
tions of an otherwise plausible model specification. Therefore,
it appears to be more promising to take the results as a warning
of the far-reaching consequences of a mismatch approach to struc-
tural unemployment and as reason enough to rethink the whole phi-
losophy behind it.- 12 -







































"LAA .= Landesarbeitsamtsbezirk ('state labour district').
AA = Arbeitsamtsbezirk ('local labour district').
[Source: Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstal t fur Arbeit,-
Jahreszahlen 19873
III. Alternative Philosophies of Structural Unemployment
Does the mismatch philosophy of structural unemployment really
capture the essence — not the manifold ambiguities — of what is
meant by a structural imbalance in the economic policy debate? In
our view, it does not, as we shall explain in the following.
When the average economist speaks of a structural imbalance be-
tween two sectoral units, say, in regional terms, the regions
"north" and "south—east" in Britain or the states "Lower Saxony"- 13 -
and "Baden-WCirttemberg" in Germany, he may do so from two differ-
ent analytical angles, depending on whether he focuses on the
performance of the economy as a whole (the "holistic approach")
or on the comparative performance of the sectors (the "compara-
7) tive sectoral approach") .
The holistic approach defines a structural imbalance as a distor-
tion within an economy which does at least some harm to the ag-
gregate performance of this economy and which can only be cured
by an appropriate rearrangement between sectors of the economy to
achieve a state of maximum aggregate performance defined as
structural balance; if at all, the quantitative relevance of the
structural imbalance can be measured by the extent of its doing
harm to the performance of the whole. It is clear that the in-
dices M and S are children of this holistic approach as they are
based on the idea that a structural imbalance is nothing but a
mismatch (or distortion) in the allocation of unemployed workers
and vacancies over the sectors of an economy leading to a less
than maximum aggregate level of hirings and thus a higher than
minimal aggregate level of unemployment.
Although elegant and intriguing as a theoretical conception, this
holistic approach has a double-edged consequence: it implies that
any differences in the individual performance between sectors -
however large they may be - are only classified as structural
imbalances to the extent that they hamper the aggregate perfor-
mance of the whole. A deliberately biased example with the com-
monly used measures M and S may clarify what is at stake. In an
economy with two sectors, say regions (1, 2), which have equal-sized labour forces L = 100,000, we assume the number of unem-
ployed workers to be 0 in region 1 (U = 0) and 100,000 in region
2 (U = 100,000), the number of vacancies to be 0 in region 1 (v"
= 0) and 1 in region 2 < V = 1). This configuration makes the
indices li and S (equations 7 and 8) indicate no structural unem-
ployment at all (M = S = 0) since aggregate hirings cannot be
increased through intersectoral movements of labour. However, the
individual performance of each region in terms of unemployment is
vastly different, with the unemployment rate being 0 '/. in region
1 and 100 */. in region 2 while the vacancy rate is exactly 0 'A in
region 1 and very close to 0 '/. in region 2. No doubt, region 1
performs much better in supplying its labour force with jobs than
region 2, and any economist looking at an economy with these
characteristics would naturally conclude that he observes ,an ex-
treme structural imbalance. Nevertheless, if he sticks to the
holistic approach imbedded in the measures M and S, he would have
to diagnose the economy to be in structural balance simply be-
cause there is no potential for improving the aggregate perfor-
mance by intersectora 1 movements of labour.
The alternative philosophy which we call comparative sectoral
approach avoids this unfortunate pitfall by defining as struc-
tural any difference in performance between the sectors of an
economy, whether they harm the aggregate performance or not. The
rationale behind this approach is straightforward: in an economy,
there are good performing and bad performing sectors; provided
that the best performing sector (S) can sensibly be assumed to
deliver an a priori acceptable maximum standard for the economy
as a whole, the negative deviation of the remaining sectors from- 15 -
this standard can be taken as the informational basis for measur-
ing the extent of the "structural problem". Note that the perfor-
mance of the economy as a whole is per se irrelevant; only the
intersectoral differences in performance count.
In our view, it is this comparative sectoral and not the holistic
approach which really addresses the main structural question of
the economic policy debate, namely the question whether an econ-
omy is integrating or disintegrating in terms of the performance
of its different sectors, be they regions, industries or even
occupations. For example, when a British (German) economist
speaks of the regional imbalance of unemployment between the re-
gion north (the state Lower Saxony) and the south-east (the state
of Baden-Wurttemberg), he is very unlikely to have in mind the
holistic issue of how much overall unemployment could hypotheti-
cal ly be reduced by a reshuffling of labour between these re-
gions; he rather compares the performance of both regions in sup-
plying their labour with jobs, thereby implicitly taking the best
performing region as a kind of reference standard for the rest of
the country.
To check whether this philosophy does in fact avoid the uncom-
fortable empirical diagnosis of the holistic approach that struc-
tural unemployment is virtually irrelevant, one has to operation-
al ise the idea of comparative sectoral performance in some aggre-
gate index of structural unemployment. There is a straightfor-
ward, almost trivial way of doing so: the logic of the approach
implies that a state of structural balance or zero structural
unemployment can be defined as that configuration where all- 16 -
sectors of the economy have the unemployment rate u . of the
best performing sector n. Hence, structural unemployment (SU) in
sector i (i = n) amounts to the excess of actual unemployment
over the hypothetical unemployment prevailing if the unemployment
rate of sector i were equal to the rate of sector n. Formally,
this means
<9) SU. = LJ. - u . L. for i = 1, ..., n
1 1 min 1
with L. being the labour force in sector i and u . being the
I min
unemployment rate of the best performing sector n (expressed as a
share of the labour force). Hence, aggregate structural unemploy-
ment is given by
(10) I SU. = IU. - u . [L. • i .1 min^: i
= U - u . L, mi n
with L being the total labour force. Note that the best perform-
ing sector n can be included in the summation since SU = 0. Di-
viding (10) by U yields the share P (P for "performance") of
structural in total unemployment as
<11) P = 1 - u . /u, mi n
with u being the economy-wide unemployment rate.
The main practical difficulty is to find an appropriate sector
(or group of sectors) which can be taken as a reasonable- 17 -
benchmark of best performance. Clearly, this is an exercise in
reasonable a priori judgement. Obviously, the sector chosen
should not be altogether untypical for the country's economy as a
whole or too small to matter at all. As to our illustrative exam-
ple of the regions in Britain and Germany, there are no serious
problems in this respect: in both countries, a large and clearly
identifiable region has consistently outpaced the others in re-
cent years, namely the South-East and East Anglia in Britain and
8) Baden-Wurttemberg in Germany.
Taking these regions as benchmarks, Table 4- presents the index P
for Britain and Germany in 1987. The most striking fact is that P
indicates a much higher share of regional unemployment for both
countries than does S in Table 2: about 30 '/. of Britain's and
about *+0 */. of Germany's unemployment are to be classified as re-
gional on this account. Hence, if measured in terms of compara-
tive sectoral performance, regional unemployment is a significant
problem in both countries, with Germany again having the lead
over Britain. As to the intertemporal development of regional
unemployment over the last 15 years in Germany, the five—year
averages of P indicate a virtually constant share of regional in
total unemployment. IMote, however, that despite the constant
share, the problem of regional unemployment has moved into very
dramatic dimensions in absolute terms, from less than 400,000
unemployed workers in 1973 to more than 900,000 in the last three
years of the sample period. On the basis of these numbers, re-
gional unemployment must be considered as a very important issue,- 18 -
Table 4: Index P for regional unemployment in Great Britain and



































LAA = Landesarbeitsamtsbezirk ('state labour district').
3
Schleswig-Holstein incl. Hamburg; Lower Saxony incl. Bremen;
Saar excluded.
[Source for Britain, Employment Gazette, August 1988;
for Germany, Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fur
Arbeit, Jahreszahlen 1973-1987; Bundesminister fur Ar-
beit, Statistik 1950; P calculated on basis of annual
average figures for 1973-1987 and March figures for 19503
although its growth has not outpaced the growth of overall unem-
ployment. For the early post-war period, the index P gives a pic-
ture which is consistent with the common view of this time in- 19 -
Germany: for 1950, a share of more than 60 */. of total unemploy-
ment is classified as regional.
Of course, the simple measure proposed here has its drawbacks as
well, even within its own scope of comparative sectoral perfor-
mance: for example, if the fast growth of a region sucks in for-
eign labour or mobilizes labour reserves, simple unemployment
rates would give a distorted picture of a region's performance in
supplying its labour force with jobs since the size of this la-
bour force itself is endogenously determined. Hence, to obtain a
more complete view of comparative regional performance, one would
have to consult additional data on employment growth and immigra-
tion. Still then, such efforts would remain within the spirit of
the comparative sectoral approach rather than the mismatch phi-
losophy. After all, it is the shift of philosophies, not some
more or less imperfect operationalisation of the philosophies
which matters in the economic policy debate.
Finally, as a general warning, it should be kept in mind that a
measure of structural imbalance at any point in time or any fixed
period must be limited in scope simply because, by its very na-
ture, structural change is dynamic. When economists speak of a
structural imbalance between the south and the north in Germany
or in Britain, they do not necessarily refer to all these unem-
ployed and vacancies which are to be counted right now or even
the employment growth in the recent past; rather, they often im-
plicitly anticipate all the new employment patterns which can
reasonably be expected to emerge in the near and not so near fu-
ture, with structural change proceeding according to some- so -
sectoral pattern predictions which depend on the change in the
international division of labour, the structure of demand and
productivity growth. This is particularly relevant in circum-
stances as they prevail in Europe where the governments of vari-
ous countries keep afli'ng industries.alive by heavy subsidization
which, at some time in the future, may have to be given up due to
9) fiscal constraints and international accords. In short, when
speaking about structural change, economists often mean poten-
tial, not actual employment and unemployment patterns. Of course,
to estimate anything like these complex potential effects of
structural change in the future is a very ambitious task going
far beyond any short-hand descriptive measures of structural im-
balance. Nevertheless, if ever operationalized, this approach
would also come closer in spirit to the comparative performance
framework than to the mismatch philosophy since it would raise
questions of how different regions, industries or occupations can
be expected to perform in the structural race. The question of
how much a redistribution of labour would improve the performance
of the whole economy would remain subordinate at best.- 21 -
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framework either reinforce our conclusion or make no economic
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elasticities" of unemployed and vacancies while keeping linear
homogeneity (i.e., a + b , but a + b = 1) ceteris paribus leads to
lower levels of M and S; assuming increasing returns, but keeping
equal partial hiring elasticities (i.e., a = b, but a + b > 1),
invalidates our conclusion, but has the economically unacceptable
implication that hirings are maximised by concentrating all unem-
ployed and vacancies in one sector (i.e., an equal number of un-
employed and vacancies in all sectors is not sufficient to yield
structural balance). Leaving the Cobb-Douglas framework makes the
whole approach technically much less tractable, since- ae -
unemployment then ceases to be attributable to structural or non-
structural factors according to a simple formula like equation
(6) .
7)
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South-East should not be taken as a reference standard alone,
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